Exceptional Sentencing in Washington after \u3ci\u3eState v. Freitag\u3c/i\u3e: Pushing the Limits of the Sentencing Reform Act by Strom, Lisa K.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 70 Number 2 
4-1-1995 
Exceptional Sentencing in Washington after State v. Freitag: 
Pushing the Limits of the Sentencing Reform Act 
Lisa K. Strom 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lisa K. Strom, Notes and Comments, Exceptional Sentencing in Washington after State v. Freitag: Pushing 
the Limits of the Sentencing Reform Act, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 563 (1995). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol70/iss2/8 
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
CopyriSht 0 1995 by Washingn Law Review Anociation
EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON AFTER
STATE V. FREITAG: PUSHING THE LIMITS OF THE
SENTENCING REFORM ACT
Lisa K. Strom
Abstract. In 1981 the Washington state legislature enacted the Sentencing Reform Act
(SRA) with the intent of reducing disparity in sentencing through the implementation of
presumptive sentencing ranges. The SRA authorizes judges to depart from the presumptive
range by imposing an exceptional sentence if appropriate mitigating or aggravating factors
exist. Since 1981, virtually all courts have determined a factor's appropriateness by
considering its relation to the factual nature of the crime itself. In State v. Freitag, however,
the Washington Court of Appeals recently held that a trial court may rely on factors which do
not directly relate to the nature of the crime as the basis for an exceptional sentence below the
standard range. By holding that the trial court may consider a defendant's personal qualities,
the stated purposes of the SRA, and the defendant's criminal history, the court has
contradicted the intent of the legislature in passing the SRA, ignored Washington case law,
and created a dangerous precedent for other courts to follow.
When it comes to sentencing convicted felons, judicial discretion and
legislative directive are invariably at odds. While judicial discretion is a
necessary concomitant of the sentencing process in Washington state,
such discretion has been expressly limited by the legislature through its
implementation of the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA or Act) of 1981.
The most important of these restrictions on judicial discretion is the
requirement that judges consider only the objective factors apparent in
each crime when deciding whether to depart from the sentencing
guidelines handed down by the state legislature.
This Note examines judicial discretion in light of a recent Washington
Court of Appeals case, State v. Freitag.1 In Freitag, the Court of
Appeals, Division One, upheld the trial court's imposition of an
exceptional sentence below the standard range, despite the inappropriate
factors upon which the trial court based its decision. The
inappropriateness of these factors lies in their subjectivity, insofar as they
encompass circumstances which focus upon the character of the
defendant rather than relate to the nature of the crime itself. This Note
argues that the trial court's application, and the appellate court's
approval, of these subjective factors as justification for imposing an
exceptional sentence below the standard range was improper and
establishes a dangerous precedent.
I. State v. Freitag, 74 Wash. App. 133, 873 P.2d 548 (1994).
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The Note begins with an overview of the historical background of the
SRA. Then, following a review of the facts of Freitag, this Note
critiques the appellate court's reasoning. Finally, this Note examines the
dangers inherent in the Freitag ruling and its deleterious effect on at least
one subsequent decision.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SENTENCING
REFORM ACT
The SRA, enacted in 1981, standardizes sentences through the use of
sentencing grids and matrixes and decreases sentence disparity
throughout the state's courts. The Act creates presumptive sentencing
ranges for felonies based on the seriousness of the crime itself, its
seriousness compared to crimes fitting within the same statutory
category, and the criminal history of the defendant.2 If a trial court finds
"substantial and compelling" reasons justifying an exceptional sentence,
it may depart from the presumptive range either upward or downward?
The court may decide, sua sponte, to impose an exceptional sentence.4
The only limitation on the length imposed is that it not be "clearly
excessive" or "clearly too lenient."5
Section 210(4) of the SRA governs review of exceptional sentences.
To reverse a trial court's exceptional sentence, the appellate court must
make the determination that either: (a) under the clearly erroneous
standard, the reasons supplied by the sentencing judge are not supported
by the record; (b) under the question of law standard, hose reasons are
insufficiently substantial and compelling to justify a sentence outside the
standard range for that offense; or (c) under the abuse of discretion
standard, the sentence imposed was either clearly excessive or clearly too
lenient.6 Considering the wide latitude of the abuse of discretion test, it
is rare that an exceptional sentence will be reversed.
2. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.010 (1994).
3. Id. § 9.94A.120(2).
4. See, e.g., State v. Falling, 50 Wash. App. 47, 52, 747 P.2d 1119, 1122 (1987).
5. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.210(4) (1994).
6. State v. Hutsell, 120 Wash. 2d 913, 916,845 P.2d 1325, 1327 (1993).
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A. Rehabilitative Ideal Abandoned in Favor ofPrinciple of "Just
Deserts "
7
Throughout most of the 1970s, defendants convicted of a felony
offense were sentenced under an indeterminate sentencing system.
Under this system, a defendant was normally sentenced for the statutory
maximum; the sentence was, however, subject to reduction or
termination by the parole board at any time after the defendant had
served the minimum period. An indeterminate sentence was, by
definition, not fixed by the trial judge but left to the determination of
parole boards, prison agencies, or some other penal authority.8
The problem with indeterminate sentencing was its lack of public
accountability.9 Once a defendant had been convicted, the public nature
of the criminal proceedings ended. The length of a prison term was
determined by parole boards, which were authorized to release prisoners
upon proof of their total rehabilitation. Because the parole boards
operated within broad statutory parameters and limited restrictions,
sentences were based more on the personal characteristics of the
offenders than on the nature of their crimes."° The division of
responsibility discouraged comprehensive publicity of a case by
disconnecting the public adjudication of guilt from the determination of a
defendant's sentence."
B. Laying the Foundation for Uniformity in Sentencing
The SRA abandoned indeterminate sentencing, parole boards, and
probation. The focus was decidedly away from the idealistic goals of
rehabilitation and toward the more pragmatic approach to sentencing
through punishment. The Act rejected the old subjective evaluation of a
criminal defendant's threat to society or amenability to reintegration into
society in favor of a wholly objective approach to sentencing, tempered
only by exceptional circumstances.
The most obvious change brought about by the SRA was its approach
to judicial discretion. Where before the discretion of judges had been
7. The term 'just deserts" as applied to purposes of the SRA was first mentioned in David
Boemer, Sentencing in Washington § 2.5(a) (1985).
8. See Black's Law Dictionary 771 (6th ed. 1990).
9. Boerner, supra note 7, § 2.4, at 2-27.
10. Boemer, supra note 7, at 1-1.
11. See Boemer, supra note 7, § 2.4, at 2-28.
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"standardless and unreview[able], ' ' 2 the SRA established that its purpose
was to develop a system that "structures, but does not eliminate' 3
discretionary decisions affecting sentences. The intent of the legislature
in passing the SRA was to ensure that criminals would be punished
according to their just deserts, and that the disparity of sentences between
two similarly-situated defendants be minimized as much as possible. 4
Consistent with these goals is the requirement that the sentence imposed
be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the offender's
criminal history.'
5
The framers of the SRA were careful to eliminate from the sentencing
process consideration of factors which did not directly relate to the
nature of the crime. 6 The legislature specifically disapproved of taking
into consideration who a person was, rather than what he or she had
done. 7 The framers took several steps to eliminate the possibility that a
judge might consider subjective factors. One step was to limit the types
of mitigating and aggravating factors available to a sentencing judge in
his or her consideration of an exceptional sentence.'
Another step was to limit structurally the sentencing judges'
discretion. The legislature sought to achieve this goal by carefully
delineating the language of the SRA's statement of purpose. 9 The first
purpose requires, essentially, that the crime itself and the previous felony
record of the defendant be the only bases for datermining what
information a trial court may consider.0 Information that does not relate
to those two factors, such as race, national origin, or religion, is not
relevant to determining proper sentences.
The legislature most clearly demonstrated its intent to limit judicial
consideration of subjective, nonoffense-related factors through the
language of RCW § 9.94A.340. This section, which provides for equal
application of the laws, states that "[t]he sentencing guidelines and
prosecuting standards apply equally to offenders in all parts of the state,
12. Boemer, supra note 7, § 2.5, at 2-30.
13. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.010 (1994).
14. Boemer, supra note 7, § 2.5(a), at 2-31.
15. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.010(1) (1994).
16. See Boemer, supra note 7, § 9.18, at 9-56.
17. Id.
18. For a complete list of the SRA's illustrative mitigating and aggravating factors, see Wash.
Rev. Code §§ 9.94A.390(1) (1994) & 9.94A.390(2) (1994), respectively.
19. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.010 (1994).
20. See id. § 9.94A.010(1).
566
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without discrimination as to any element that does not relate to the crime
or the previous record of the defendant.""1 Thus, any case which relies
upon purely subjective factors as justification for departure from the
sentencing guidelines would appear to violate this core provision of the
SRA.
II. OVERVIEW OF FREITAG
At issue in State v. Freitag' was an exceptional downward sentence
imposed for vehicular assault. The trial court's justification for its
sentence was based on a number of factors, including the defendant's
remorse for her crime, her good character, and her low risk of reoffense.
Holding that such factors were an appropriate basis for an exceptional
sentence, a panel of the Washington Court of Appeals upheld the
exceptional sentence.
A. The Facts of Freitag
Angela Freitag was a twenty-three-year-old law school student from
Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. On August 14, 1991, she
flew cross-country to Seattle to attend a friend's wedding. At the
rehearsal dinner that evening, she participated in a series of ritual toasts.
Upon driving home at 3:00 a.m. in an uninsured Porsche, Freitag ran
through a red light and collided with a vehicle broadside, breaking the
occupant's neck. After initially refusing, Freitag submitted to a
breathalyzer test which measured her blood alcohol content at 0.16
grams per 100 milliliters.' Freitag pled guilty to the charge of vehicular
assault in violation of RCW § 46.61.522.24
B. The Sentencing ofAngela Freitag
Considered a "violent offense,"'' vehicular assault is categorized as a
"most serious' 6 Level IV felony.27 The presumptive sentencing range
21. Id. § 9.94A.340.
22. 74 Wash. App. 133, 873 P.2d 548 (1994).
23. Under Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.502(1) (1994), a person is guilty of driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor ifhe drives a vehicle while he has 0.10 grams or more of alcohol per
210 liters of breath. This standard is equivalent to 0.10 grams per 100 milliliters.
24. Freitag, 74 Wash. App. at 135, 873 P.2d at 549.
25. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.030(36)(a) (1994).
26. Id. § 9.94A.030(21)(q).
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for a defendant convicted of vehicular assault with a zero offender score
is three to nine months.28 At Freitag's sentencing hearing the state
recommended five months of incarceration, twelve months of
community supervision, and restitution. The trial court imposed an
exceptional sentence of ninety days in the county jail with eighty-nine of
those days converted to 712 hours of community service. One-half of
the community service was to be performed at a free legld clinic and one-
half at a health care facility providing rehabilitation to seriously injured
accident victims. Full restitution to the victim was ordered, and Freitag
was placed on community supervision after serving her one day in jail.
At 90 days, the length of Freitag's sentence fit within the low end of
the standard range. What made her sentence exceptional was not the
duration of the sentence, however, but the fact that the imposed jail time
was converted to community service. Under the SRA, such conversion
is strictly limited to offenders convicted of non-violent offenses and in
those circumstances is specifically limited to 30 days. 29  Because
vehicular assault is defined as a violent offense, and thus not covered
under this provision, the sentence was exceptional.
Foremost among the trial judge's reasons for the exceptional sentence
was the fact that the defendant had led a crime-free life.3 ' The judge took
into consideration not only the defendant's lack of criminal convictions
but also the complete absence from her record of any police contacts
whatsoever. Another consideration was the quality of life the defendant
had led,31 as evidenced by her community volunteer work. 2 The trial
27. Id. § 9.94A.320.
28. Id. § 9.94A.3 10. Vehicular Assault is included in seriousness score level IV on Table 1 of the
sentencing grid as follows:
Seriousness
Score Offender Score
0 1 2 3
IV 6m 9m 13m 15m
3- 6- 12+- 13-
9 12 14 17
NOTE: Numbers in the first horizontal row of each seriousness catego y represent sentencing
midpoints in months(m). Numbers in the second and third rows represent presumptive sentencing
ranges in months. Id.
29. Id. § 9.94A.380.
30. State v. Freitag, 74 Wash. App. 133, 137-38, 873 P.2d 548,550 (1994).
31. Id. at 138, 873 P.2d at 550-51.
32. During summer vacations Freitag had worked as an unpaid volunteer for different charitable
organizations, such as a free medical clinic in Mexico and a social services clinic for the poor in
Vol. 70:563, 1995
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judge also noted that his imposition of a more lenient sentence than that
represented by the standard range would benefit the defendant and make
frugal use of state and local resources by alleviating the problem of jail
overcrowding.33 Yet another reason the trial judge gave for the
exceptional sentence was the adequate protection of the public in view of
the defendant's low risk of reoffense"
The state appealed the exceptional sentence, alleging that the reasons
given by the sentencing judge were not substantial and compelling and
that the sentence given was clearly too lenient. The court of appeals
rejected both of the state's arguments and affirmed the sentence. After
concluding that these factors were an appropriate basis for consideration
of an exceptional sentence, the court of appeals refused to find that the
trial judge had abused his discretion.
III. THE FREITAG COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF INAPPROPRI-
ATE FACTORS TO JUSTIFY AN EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCE
In Freitag, the appellate court determined that, because of the
defendant's family background, her remorse, and her charitable instincts,
Freitag deserved a lighter sentence than other offenders accused of the
same crime. Considering the clear intent of the framers of the SRA, as
well as the great weight of contrary Washington case law, judicial
acceptance of such factors was an abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court and a dereliction of duty on the part of the appellate court.
The trial court's reliance on subjective findings of fact was improper and
unsupported. The court also erroneously considered the SRA's stated
purposes as a basis for imposing an exceptional sentence downward.
Finally, the Freitag court unjustifiably sanctioned the trial court's
reliance upon a defendant's criminal history as a reason for departing
from the standard range.
A. Freitag's Reliance on Subjective Findings of Fact Contradicts the
Objectives of the SRA
Frustrated with the degree to which their discretion is curtailed by the
dictates of the SRA, some trial judges have begun to pay more attention
Appalachia. During school terms, she had participated in the Meals-on-Wheels program for the
elderly and helped to prepare meals at Thanksgiving for the homeless. Id. at 136, 873 P.2d. at 550.
33. Id. at 138, 873 P.2d at 551.
34. Id.
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to factors not contemplated by the SRA.31 Their motivation for doing so
lies in their sympathy for the defendant. Howeve, noble judicial
sympathy for a criminal defendant may be, it is an entirely inappropriate
basis upon which to justify a criminal sentence, especially when the
legislature has passed an act as comprehensive as the SMA .
In Freitag, both the trial court and the appellate court felt a great deal
of sympathy for the defendant. The trial court acknowledged that "there
is nothing mitigating about the crime itself, which involved a blood
alcohol level of 0.16 and serious injuries to the victim.1 36 Nevertheless,
the trial court entered six findings of fact which leave lit:le doubt that the
court admired Freitag's personal qualities and sympathized with her
misfortune. Likewise, the appellate court found that Freitag was entitled
to an exceptional sentence because "[she] is young and was
inexperienced with the adverse effects of alcohol on her sleep-deprived
and jet-lagged body; showed deep remorse;.., had demonstrated a clear
pattern of civic and social responsibility and presented no risk to
reoffend in this or any other manner."37
1. Freitag's Value-Based Subjective Determinations are Contrary to
the SRA and the Weight of Washington Case Law
Punishing a defendant based on who she is and not what she has done
is directly adverse to the tenets of the SRA. Yet Freitag's exceptional
sentence was based entirely on a subjective evaluation of her personal
character. In his dissent, Judge Forrest declared that there was no effort
by the trial court to relate any of its findings to the philo:3ophy or specific
provisions of the SRA. 8
Eliminating the element of surprise and uncertainty hi sentencing was
a major purpose of the SRA. In order to achieve this goal, the SRA
presumes that only those factors which go to the nature of the crime
35. See, e.g, State v. Friederich-Tibbets, 70 Wash. App. 93, 96, 853 P.2d 457, 459 (1993)
(quoting trial court findings) ('[B]ecause I'm somewhat frustrated... by thi case... I'm going to
make findings for purposes of the record."), rev'd on other grounds, 123 Wash. 2d 250, 866 P.2d
1257 (1994); see also State v. Hutsell, 120 Wash. 2d 913, 924, 845 P.2d 1325, 1331 (1993) (quoting
State v. Harper, 62 Wash. App. 69, 78-79, 813 P.2d 593, 598 (1991)) ("We understand the current
frustration with the dearth of sentencing options, but... our responsibility is to 'apply the SRA as
written.").
36. Freitag, 74 Wash. App. at 138, 873 P.2d at 551.
37. Id. at 149, 873 P.2d at 557.
38. Id. at 154, 873 P.2d at 559 (Forrest, ., dissenting).
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itself, rather than the character of the defendant, will be used to justify
departures from a legislatively-prescribed sentence.
a. Freitag Fails to Assign Sufficient Weight to Precedential Authority
The basic presumption that justification for a sentence outside the
standard range must be based on the facts of the crime is supported by
Washington case law. In State v. Alexander,39 the court of appeals held
that the SRA permits courts limited discretion to exceed or go below the
standard range when the facts of the defendant's commission of the
crime distinguish it from other violations of the same statute.' The
appellate court drew the line, however, at nonoffense-related factors,
holding that an exceptional sentence based upon the defendant's personal
history or characteristics differing from those of other violators derives
no authority from the SRA 41
The Alexander rule followed a considerable weight of precedential
authority. The great majority of these cases hold that for an exceptional
sentence to be upheld on review, the circumstances surrounding the
crime must truly be exceptional. To be exceptional, the facts of the
crime must either be so uniquely heinous or so deserving of leniency that
a sentence within the standard range would offend one's sense of justice.
State v. Estrella and State v. Pennington are two supreme court cases
which adopt this reasoning.42 Both cases establish that it is the nature of
the crime that determines the qualification for an exceptional sentence
and not the personal traits, motive, emotions, or intent of the defendant.
In addition, nearly seven years earlier, the supreme court distinguished
routine offenses from those crimes committed under extraordinary
circumstances, concluding that it is only the latter which deserve
exceptional treatment.43
39. 70 Wash. App. 608, 854 P.2d 1105 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, 125 Wash. 2d 717, 888
P.2d 1169 (1995). Judge Forrest wrote the majority opinion.
40. Id. at 616-17, 854 P.2d at 1109.
41. Id. On appeal, the supreme court declined to pass on the proper test for determining whether a
fact not directly related to the commission of the crime constitutes a substantial and compelling
reason for departure from the standard range. 125 Wash. 2d 717,724-25 n. 13,888 P.2d 1169, 1173
n.13 (1995).
42. State v. Estrella, 115 Wash. 2d 350, 359, 798 P.2d 289, 293 (1990) (concluding that nothing
in the circumstances of the defendant's burglary "distinguish[es] it in any way from other second
degree burglaries"); State v. Pennington, 112 Wash. 2d 606, 610, 772 P.2d 1009, 1012 (1989)
(rejecting trial court's reliance on the defendant's drug dependency as a basis for exceptional
sentence).
43. State v. Oxborrow, 106 Wash. 2d 525, 533,723 P.2d 1123, 1128 (1986).
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According to the supreme court, imposition of an exceptional sentence
depends upon the nature of the offense committed, viewed against the
backdrop of the typical offense contemplated by the particular statute. In
Freitag, the trial court failed to make any findings of fact which
explained how Freitag's act differed from all other vehicular assaults.
The SRA requires that, in the absence of appropriate mitigating
circumstances, a defendant must be sentenced within the confines of the
guidelines. Thus, the Freitag court erred in imposing an exceptional
sentence for what was a routine offense.
b. The Cases Relied upon in Freitag Are Distinguishable
The Freitag court could point to few cases in support of its decision.
One such case is State v. Nelson." Nelson, however, is distinguishable
from Freitag. In Nelson, the supreme court held that a total absence of
previous criminal activity justified an exceptional sente:ace downward. 45
This holding must be read narrowly because it concerned a failed
entrapment defense, an element of which is the defendant's
predisposition to commit the crime itself. Far from supporting Freitag's
holding, Nelson stands for the proposition that a complete absence of
police contacts may be considered where a defendant has unsuccessfully
asserted an entrapment defense.
The other case cited in Freitag, State v. Friederich-Tibbets,46 has been
discounted by subsequent case law 7 and reversed by the Washington
Supreme Court.48  It thereby lacks precedential authority. Friederich-
Tibbets involved possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver. A panel of Division One of the court of appeals 49 reversed the
44. 108 Wash. 2d 491,740 P.2d 835 (1987). See also infra text accompanying note 120.
45. Id. at 498, 740 P.2d at 839.
46. 70 Wash. App. 93, 853 P.2d 457 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, 123 Wash. 2d 250, 866 P.2d
1257 (1994).
47. See infra notes 58, 83-84 and accompanying text.
48. State v. Friderich-Tibbets, 123 Wash. 2d 250, 866 P.2d 1257 (1994). The supreme court did
not address the merits of the case, but instead relied upon Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.210(1) which
provides that "[a] sentence within the standard range for the offense shall not be appealed." Id. at
252, 866 P.2d at 1257.
49. A brief examination of the line-up of judges in several applicable cames demonstrates that a
split of authority within the first division of the Washington Court of Appeal, has arisen with regard
to issues involving exceptional sentencing under the SRA. Judge Kennedy, who wrote the Freitag
opinion, concurred in Friedeich-Tibbets, while Judge Forrest wrote the dissenting opinion in both
cases. Judge Forrest also wrote the majority opinion in State v. Alexander, 70 Wash. App. 608, 854
P.2d 1105 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, 125 Wash. 2d 717, 888 P.2d 1169 (1995), a case in which
the holding directly contradicts that of Freitag. See supra text accompanying note 40. Such a split
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trial court's decision and held that ajudge has the discretion to impose an
exceptional sentence below the standard range, even though the cited
reasons are not offense-related factors. The standard range for the
offense was twenty-six to thirty-four months imprisonment. The trial
court imposed a twenty-six-month sentence with twelve months
community placement." Although the sentence imposed was within the
standard range, the trial judge decided to preserve the record, ostensibly
for the purpose of appellate review." By listing its findings, the trial
court was handing the appellate court an opportunity to reverse. The
findings of fact included the defendant's remorse,52 his lifestyle
improvements,53 his employer's high regard for his work, 4 and the fact
that he was married and raising a family.55 To its credit, the trial court
concluded that, although it wished to impose upon the defendant a more
lenient sentence than he would receive under the sentencing guidelines,
"none of the above facts . .. constitute substantial and compelling
mitigating factors sufficient to justify an exceptional sentence below the
standard range."56 The court also acknowledged, albeit reluctantly, that
none of the listed factors related to the nature of the crime and thus were
inappropriate for the court to consider in granting an exceptional
sentence.57
The trial judge obviously felt a great deal of sympathy for Freiderich-
Tibbets and admittedly felt frustration with his limited discretion to tailor
the sentence to the individual circumstances of the case. Despite these
feelings, the Friederich-Tibbets trial court managed to exercise an'
admirable degree of judicial restraint: acknowledging that its sympathies
lay with the defendant, yet refusing to violate outright the tenets of the
SRA in the name of untrammeled judicial discretion. The court of
appeals, however, accepted the trial court's invitation to reverse. This
in authority necessarily weakens the relative precedential authority of the court of appeals and leads
to unfairness for the defendant whose fate may well be determined by the particular panel which
hears his case.
50. Friederich-Tibbets, 70 Wash. App. at 94, 853 P.2d at 458, rev'd on other grounds, 123 Wash.
2d 250, 866 P.2d 1257 (1994).
51. Id. at 96, 853 P.2d at 459. See also supra note 35.
52. Id. at 94, 853 P.2d at 458.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 98, 853 P.2d at 460.
56. Id. at 95, 853 P.2d at 458.
57. Id. at 96, 853 P.2d at 459.
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holding has been expressly rejected as contrary to supreme court
authority by another panel of the same division of the court of appeals. 8
When the same panel of the appellate court reversed the trial court's
decision in Freiderich-Tibbets and then affirmed the Freitag sentence, it
ignored its duty as an appellate body to recognize a trial judge's abuse of
discretion. As numerous courts have held, it is the role of the legislature
to change the law if justice so requires.5 9 Until then, the judiciary has the
sworn duty to uphold and apply the law as written.
2. Problems That Arise When a Court Bases Its Decision on
Subjective Findings of Fact
Various dangers exist when courts are allowed to make subjective and
value-based determinations. First and foremost, when a trial court relies
upon subjective factors as the basis for its sentence, it runs the risk of
violating constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the laws. After
Freitag, a defendant whose case is heard before a judge who adheres to
the reasoning espoused by the Freitag dissent and the vast weight of
Washington case law will most likely be given a harsher sentence than
another who is similarly situated but has the good fortune of appealing to
the sympathies of a judge who wholeheartedly adopts the Freitag
majority's reasoning. The former defendant may have a good argument
that his sentence violates the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause.'
Another danger arising from consideration of subjective findings of
fact is a court's engagement in the trial of collateral matters. As defense
attorneys read Freitag and begin to appreciate the connection between
reduced sentence lengths and judicial sympathy for the defendant, they
will increasingly focus their energies upon a desirable portrayal of their
client's character. Courts may soon find themselves embroiled in
lengthy determinations of the "quality of life" led by the defendant,
rather than concentrating on the facts of the case at hand. In the interests
of judicial efficiency, it is necessary to narrow the focus of criminal trials
58. See State v. Hodges, 70 Wash. App. 621, 625, 855 P.2d 291,294 (1993) (holding that because
the Freiderich-Tibbets majority did not consider binding supreme court authority, its holding is "of
questionable precedential value").
59. See, e.g., State v. Hutsell, 120 Wash. 2d 913, 924, 845 P.2d 1325, 1331 (1993); Hodges, 70
Wash. App. at 626 n.4, 855 P.2d at 294 nA; State v. Alexander, 70 Wash. App. 608, 615, 854 P.2d
1105, 1108 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, 125 Wash. 2d 717, 888 P.2d 1169 (1995).
60. See, e.g., State v. Clinton, 48 Wash. App. 671, 680, 741 P.2d 52, 57 (1987) (reversing, on
equal protection grounds, defendant's exceptional upward sentence for convictions of first degree
rape and burglary where co-defendant had received sentence within the standard range).
574
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to the nature of the crime itself in order to eliminate the waste of time on
such collateral matters.
A third danger is the possibility that two defendants charged with
violating the same statute and possessing similar criminal histories will
be given disparate sentences. When a court bases its imposition of an
exceptional sentence upon the type of subjective factors that the trial
court considered in Freitag, the unpredictable nature of criminal
sentencing proceedings proves unfair to the defendant who receives a
harsher sentence than that prescribed under the SRA. On the other hand,
consideration of subjective factors provides a windfall for lucky
defendants whose good character has bought them some time.
State v. Hodges61 illustrates the danger of disparate sentencing. Lisa
Hodges was convicted of one count of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver. Her presumptive sentence under the
SRA sentencing guidelines was twenty-one to twenty-seven months. 62
Noting that she was supplied with the drugs by a male source and that
she herself did not use cocaine, the trial court deviated downward from
the standard range and imposed an exceptional sentence of thirty days'
confinement and 400 hours of community service plus twenty-four
months of supervision.63 The court entered various findings of fact
which focused on her community support, efforts at self-improvement,
and maternal obligations.' The Washington Court of Appeals reversed
the sentence, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by
considering factors not directly related to the offense.65
Lisa Hodges was unquestionably a sympathetic figure: the facts were
undisputed that she sold drugs to feed her family and that she herself was
"clean." Yet the appellate court found these factors insufficient in light of
the underlying precepts of the SRA to justify an exceptional sentence.
While acknowledging the defendant's commendable concern for her
children, the court noted that there was nothing which distinguished her
crime from others of its kind.66 In reversing Hodges' exceptional
sentence, the court stated that exceptional sentences are appropriate only
61. 70 Wash. App. 621,855 P.2d 291 (1993).
62. Id. at 623, 855 P.2d at 292.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 625-26, 855 P.2d at 294.
66. Id. at 626, 855 P.2d at 294.
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when the circumstances of the crime distinguish it from other crimes of
the same statutory category. 67
A comparison of Hodges and Freitag demonstrates how unauthorized
judicial discretion may lead to unfair disparity in defendants' sentences.
Both women committed crimes against the health and safety of society,
and both struck sympathetic figures. And yet, Hodges was sentenced
within the presumptive range while Freitag was given the lightest
sentence in state history for her offense. The reason behind this disparity
essentially boils down to judicial self-restraint. In Hodges, the court
made a conscientious choice to follow the SRA to the letter, however
disadvantageous that might be for an otherwise admirable defendant.
The Freitag court, in contrast, allowed its sympathy for the individual
defendant to outweigh the plain meaning of the SRA and the precedential
authority of prior case law. The Hodges court recognized its duty to
apply the law as written, while Freitag found similar self-restraint too
great a burden.
B. Standing Alone, the Stated Purposes of the SRA Cannot Be Used to
Justify an Exceptional Sentence
One of the issues raised by Freitag is whether the purposes of the
SRA can be used to justify an exceptional sentence downward.8 Finding
of fact five noted that, by reducing the length of Freitag's incarceration,
the court was making "frugal use of state and local resources" by
alleviating the problem of jail overcrowding.69 In its finding of fact six,
the trial court cited the defendant's lack of threat to society.7 As Judge
Forrest noted in his dissenting opinion, finding of fact five directly
relates to RCW § 9.94A.010(5), which deals with the offender's
opportunity for improvement, and to RCW § 9.94A.010(6), which
advocates frugal use of the state's resources. Finding of fact six relies on
67. Id. at 624, 855 P.2d at 293 (citing State v. Pennington, 112 Wash. 2d 606, 610,772 P.2d 1009,
1012 (1989)).
68. The purposes relied upon by the Freitag majority are the last three listed in Wash. Rev. Code
§ 9.94A.010 (1994). This provision states that the SRA was purposely desigr ed to:
(4) Protect the public;
(5) Offer the offender an opportunity to improve him or herself; and
(6) Make frugal use of the state's resources.
69. State v. Freitag, 74 Wash. App. 133, 138, 873 P.2d 548, 551 (1994).
70. Id.
576
Vol. 70:563, 1995
Exceptional Sentencing
RCW § 9.94A.010(4), contemplating protection of the public, and upon
RCW § 9.94A.010(1), dealing with proportionality of punishment.71
In his dissent, Judge Forrest stated what should be the definitive rule
on this issue: "The general statement of purposes cannot be relied upon
directly as a basis for an exceptional sentence."'72 Because the SRA does
not include reference to its purposes as an appropriate factor justifying an
exceptional sentence, and because Washington case law rejects this use
of the SRA's purposes, it was erroneous for the Freitag court to rule that
these findings of fact were substantial and compelling reasons for an
exceptional sentence. Except for State v. Friederich-Tibbets,73 there are
no cases which have upheld exceptional sentences solely by citing the
statement of purposes of the SRA.'4 In the absence of a special directive
by the legislature, the stated purposes of the SRA should be guiding,
theoretical examples of the types of purposes the drafters had in mind
when they were writing the Sentencing Reform Act. These purposes
may justify sentences within the presumptive ranges established by the
Act but should not be used to deviate from them.
1. Washington Case Law Prohibits Reliance on the SRA s Stated
Purposes in the Absence of Factors Inherent in the Commission of
the Crime
State v. Alexander75 held that conformance with the SRA's stated
purposes does not warrant an exceptional sentence. In Alexander, the
defendant was convicted of one count of delivery of a controlled
substance. The defendant had two potentially mitigating circumstances
on his side: his low standing in the drug hierarchy and the minute amount
of illegal substance involved.76 With one prior offense, the presumptive
range for the defendant's offense was thirty-six to forty-eight months'
71. Id. at 156, 873 P.2d at 560 (Forrest, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. 70 Wash. App. 93, 853 P.2d 457 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, 123 Wash. 2d 250, 866 P.2d
1257 (1994).
74. Id. at 157, 873 P.2d at 561.
75. 70 Wash. App. 608, 617, 854 P.2d 1105, 1109 (1993), rev'don other grounds, 125 Wash. 2d
717, 888 P.2d 1169 (1995).
76. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment solely on the grounds
that both findings of fact are proper mitigating factors under the SRA. State v. Alexander, 125
Wash. 2d 717, 888 P.2d 1169 (1994).
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imprisonment. The trial court gave Alexander an exceptional sentence of
eighteen months.77
In justifying this departure from the standard range, the trial court
relied on the SRA's first two statements of purpose.78 A panel of the first
division of the court of appeals reversed, stating that the statement of
purposes prefaces the SRA sentencing scheme as a whole and is not to be
imported in sections so as to support exceptional sentences.79  The
Alexander court granted that once a proper mitigating or aggravating
factor is found, the statements of purpose may properly be considered in
selecting a sentence.80 But it is inproper to allow the purposes in and of
themselves to warrant going outside the standard range. Whereas State v.
Hodges"1 rejected the Friederich-Tibbets"2 decision because it improperly
considered subjective factors, the Alexander court dismissed the
precedential value of Friederich-Tibbets because of its inappropriate
reliance on the stated purposes of the SRA to justify its departure from
the standard range. In a footnote, the Alexander court acknowledged that
in State v. Friederich-Tibbets, a panel of the appellate court held that the
SRA's statement of purposes may constitute a "substantial and
compelling reason" for an exceptional sentence.8" While the court
professed its reluctance to disagree with another paneL of the court, it
concluded that the Friederich-Tibbets holding was unpersuasive and
declined to follow it unless approved by the supreme court."
In State v. Clinton,8" the court of appeals expressly rejected the state's
reliance upon the purposes of the SRA as justification for an exceptional
sentence upward. 6 In Clinton, the defendant was charged with a crime
committed by himself and two co-defendants. The standard range for the
77. Id. at 610,854 P.2d at 1106.
78. The first two purposes provide that the SRA is designed to:
(1) Ensure that the punishment for a criminal offense is proportionate to the seriousness of the
offense and the offender's criminal history;
(2) Promote respect for the law by providing punishment which is just.
Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.010 (1994).
79. Alexander, 70 Wash. App. at 616, 854 P.2d at 1109.
80. Id. at 617, 854 P.2d at 1109.
81. 70 Wash. App. 621,855 P.2d 291 (1993).
82. 70 Wash. App. 93, 853 P.2d 457 (1993), rev'don other grounds, 123 Wash. 2d 250, 866 P.2d
1257 (1994).
83. Id. at 617 n.12, 854P.2dat 1109 n.12.
84. Id.
85. 48 Wash. App. 671, 741 P.2d 52 (1987).
86. Id. at 679, 741 P.2d at 56.
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defendant's conviction on three counts of first degree rape was sixty-
seven to eighty-nine months for the first rape conviction and fifty-one to
sixty-eight months for each of the other two." The trial court had
followed the recommendation of the state and imposed an exceptional
sentence of nine years for each rape conviction, to run consecutively to
one another and concurrently with the sentences for the three burglary
convictions." One of the co-defendants, however, received a sentence
within the standard range. 9
On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals, Division One, rejected
the state's contention that the first stated purpose of the SRA9° could be
relied upon to justify disparate sentences between two co-defendants.
The court noted that the cited purpose appeared to be merely an
explanation of the factors used in the establishment of standard sentence
ranges themselves. It was not in itself a justification for the imposition
of exceptional sentences.9'
2. Exceptional Sentences Based on the Likelihood ofReoffense Have
Been Expressly Rejected by Washington Courts
In granting Freitag her exceptional sentence, the trial court was
noticeably influenced by her supposed lack of future dangerousness or
propensity to reoffend.92 This circumstance is not an appropriate finding
of fact, however, upon which to justify a sentence of one day in jail,
coupled with community service. Again, established Washington case
law contradicts the Freitag reasoning that the SRA's stated purposes in
RCW § 9.94A.010 are an appropriate basis, in light of the defendant's
good character and lack of prior police contacts, on which to justify an
exceptional sentence.
In State v. Allert,93 the supreme court held that a determination that a
convicted person does not pose a threat to the public is not a justification
for imposing a sentence less than the standard range.94 The Washington
87. Id. at 674, 741 P.2d at 54.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 678, 741 P.2d at 56.
90. See supra note 78.
91. Clinton, 48 Wash. App. at 679,741 P.2d at 56.
92. State v. Freitag, 74 Wash. App. 133, 138, 873 P.2d 548, 551 (1994).
93. 117 Wash. 2d 156, 815 P.2d 752 (1991).
94. Id. at 169, 815 P.2d at 759 (citing State v. Pascal, 108 Wash. 2d 125, 137, 736 P.2d 1065
(1987)). In addition to its holding that the trial court erred in relying on a finding that the defendant
did not pose a future risk to the community in terms of criminal, violent, or assaultive behavior to
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Court of Appeals, Division Three, attempted to narrow that ruling
somewhat in State v. McClure95 when it held that future dangerousness is
not a basis for an exceptional sentence in a non-sexual offender case.
96
Finally, in State v. Payne,97 Division Two dismissed the contention that
"protecting the public," one of the SRA's avowed purposes, is a viable
reason upon which to justify an exceptional sentence."s After all, the
panel noted, "an implied purpose of all criminal statutes is to protect the
public." 99 The court pointed out that relying on this one purpose of the
SRA as justification for an exceptional sentence actually serves to
undercut the other purposes of the SRA, most notably -he objectives of
proportionality and uniformity."°
The offense involved in Freitag was an ordinary instamce of vehicular
assault. Conspicuously absent from this particular case were any unique
or unusual circumstances differentiating this offense from any other
violation of the same criminal statute. There were simply no appropriate
factors that could justify the exceptional sentence. Considering this,
Freitag's exceptional sentence should have been reversed by the court of
appeals as an abuse of discretion by the trial judge.
C. By Considering Criminal History, the Court Double-Counted
Freitag's Zero Offender Score
When sentencing a defendant under the Sentencing Reform Act, the
trial court looks to the sentencing grid under RCW § 9.94A.310. Under
this grid, the court determines the presumptive range by locating the
seriousness score of the defendant's current offense in the vertical
column and then pinpointing the defendant's offender score in the
justify an exceptional sentence, the supreme court assigned error to the lowcT court's consideration
of the defendant's personal history. Specifielly, the trial court erred in considering the defendant's
depression, severe compulsive personality, and alcoholism. Id. at 164, 815 P.2d at 756.
95. 64 Wash. App. 528, 827 P.2d 290 (1992).
96. Id. at 531, 827 P.2d at 292 (citing State v. Barnes, 117 Wash. 2d 701, 711, 818 P.2d 1088,
1093 (1991)). See also State v. Smith, 64 Wash. App. 620, 825 P.2d 741 (1992) (holding that future
dangerousness in non-sex offense cases was improperly considered as an aggravating factor).
97. 45 Wash. App. 528, 726 P.2d 997 (1986).
98. Id. at 532, 726 P.2d at 1000. See also State v. Pennington, 112 Wash. 2d 606, 609, 772 P.2d
1009, 1011 (1989) (holding that a trial court's finding of fact that society would be better protected
by a defendant's placement in an in-patient rehabilitation program is a "legal conclusion, and not a
finding of fact").
99. Payne, 45 Wash. App. at 532, 726 P.2d at 1000.
100. Id. at 533, 726 P.2d at 1000.
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horizontal column.' °' The offender score is calculated according to a
series of rules located in another section of the Act.' °2 The purpose
behind RCW § 9.94A.310 is to further the purpose behind the SRA of
promoting proportionality in sentencing. The more serious the
defendant's prior convictions, the harsher the presumptive sentence will
be.
The supreme court has consistently held that a defendant's criminal
history is one of the components used to compute the presumptive range
for an offense under the SRA and therefore may not be counted again as
a mitigating circumstance to justify departure from the range. 3 To do
so would constitute double counting. The Freitag court realized that the
undisputed acceptance of this rule in Washington courts prohibited its
using Freitag's lack of criminal convictions as a justification for the
exceptional sentence. Through a unique perversion of the language and
intent of the SRA, the Freitag majority justified its exceptional sentence
by distinguishing between the defendant's history of criminal
convictions and her history of misdemeanors.
In its finding of fact number two, the trial court stated, "The defendant
has no prior criminal history, not just in the statutory sense of the word,
but in the real life sense of the word.""' Despite the total lack of
authorization from the SRA, the Freitag court held, in essence, that a
defendant's lack of aggravating circumstances (such as the presence of
recorded misdemeanors) creates in and of itself a mitigating factor that
justifies departure from the standard range. As Judge Forrest noted in his
dissent, "[s]uch a result is contrary to the spirit and the letter of the
Sentencing Reform Act and is not supported by Washington case law."'0 5
101. See supra note 28.
102. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.360 (1994).
103. State v. Rogers, 112 Wash. 2d 180, 183, 770 P.2d 180, 181 (1989) (holding that absence of
prior criminal convictions does not justify a sentence below standard range); State v. Pascal, 108
Wash. 2d 125, 137, 736 P.2d 1065, 1072 (1987) (determining that criminal history may not be
counted again as a mitigating circumstance to justify departure from the range); State v. Armstrong,
106 Wash. 2d 547, 551, 723 P.2d 1111, 1114 (1986) (finding lack of criminal history not a
substantial and compelling reason for exceptional sentence); State v. Nordby, 106 Wash. 2d 514, 518
n.4, 723 P.2d 1117, 1119 n.4 (1986) (holding that since criminal history is already one of the
components used to compute the presumptive range, it may not also be used as justification for
exceptional sentence).
104. State v. Freitag, 74 Wash. App. 133, 137, 873 P.2d 548, 550 (1994).
105. Id. at 149, 873 P.2d at 557 (1994) (Forrest, J., dissenting).
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1. Washington Case Law Does Not Allow Use of a Deendant's
Criminal History as a Mitigating Factor
It is true that, prior to Freitag, the court of appeals had already held
that a trial court may consider a defendant's record of misdemeanors an
appropriate aggravating circumstance.'t 6 On this basis, the Freitag court
concluded by "some logical symmetry or corollary"' 07 that a complete
absence of police contacts amounts to a mitigating circumstance. But a
holding that a history of misdemeanors may constitute an aggravating
circumstance does not necessarily imply that a lack thereof imparts a
mitigating circumstance. Furthermore, nothing in the language of RCW
§ 9.94A.390, which provides for statutory aggravating circumstances,
indicates that their absence establishes a mitigating circumstance. The
converse also holds true: it would be grossly unfair to defendants to
allow courts to consider a defendant's lack of mitigating factors an
aggravating circumstance warranting an exceptional sentence above the
standard range.
Unfortunately, there is no direct holding by the supreme court stating
unequivocally that a defendant's history of misdemeanors, rather than
felonies, is an inappropriate basis on which to justify an exceptional
sentence. The supreme court has, however, rejected every attempt made
by a trial court to rely upon a defendant's criminal history as a
justification for departing from the standard range.'"' In reviewing
exceptional sentences, the supreme court has never distinguished
between felony convictions and recorded misdemeanors. Instead, it has
spoken only of a defendant's general criminal history. A literal reading
106. State v. Roberts, 55 Wash. App. 573, 779 P.2d 732, review denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1026, 782
P.2d 1069 (1989). This case should be read narrowly. The defendant in Roberts was convicted of
two counts of vehicular homicide committed while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Her
offender score did not reflect the three negligent driving convictions she had received within 15
months of the fatal crash and her history of driving under the influence. The: presumptive sentence
range was 31 to 41 months; she was given an exceptional sentence of 120 months. Id. at 577, 779
P.2d at 734. The appellate court affirmed, noting that courts could consider uncounted
misdemeanors as aggravating factors. As ajustification for its holding, the court stated that the three
uncounted misdemeanors established a pattern of incidents in which Roberts lost control of her
vehicle. Id. at 579, 779 P.2d at 735.
In Roberts, the misdemeanors were so factually similar to the offense at is;sue that they could be
said to constitute an aggravating circumstance in themselves. The case thin: stands for the narrow
rule that a history of misdemeanors may constitute an aggravating circuntance only when it is
specifically related to the current offense so as to give the offender adequate notice of the danger her
conduct poses to society.
107. Freitag, 74 Wash. App. at 152, 873 P.2d at 559 (Forrest, J., dissenting).
108. See supra note 103.
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of this language would make it difficult to believe that criminal history
specifically did not include a defendant's history of misdemeanors. To
hold that felony convictions fall within a defendant's criminal history,
but that misdemeanors do not, needlessly obfuscates the plain language
of both the SRA and the supreme court.
Washington's state courts have repeatedly made it clear that a lack of
aggravating factors fails to create a mitigating factor in and of itself. In
State v. Armstrong,"° the defendant was convicted of second degree
assault. The defendant asserted that the fact that he had taken his victim
to the hospital after the assault, and that his crime was not premeditated,
constituted mitigating circumstances. The supreme court rejected this
argument, stating that these factors simply showed the lack of an
aggravating circumstance and that this fact alone does not create a
mitigating circumstance."1 0
In State v. Alexander,"' the trial court attempted to give the defendant
an exceptional sentence downward based on the converse of the principle
that the presence of aggravating circumstances in a crime warrants
exceptional sentencing upward. The trial court reasoned that if the
above principle was true, then its logical corollary, that the absence of
aggravating factors justified an exceptional sentence downward, must
also be true. The appellate court rejected the trial court's analysis,"'
reversed the sentence, and remanded for resentencing without the logical
corollary."'
Although neither Armstrong nor Alexander dealt specifically with the
issue of whether a lack of misdemeanors may be used to justify an
exceptional sentence downward, the same rationale applies. The SRA
authorizes a court to sentence a defendant based upon both the
seriousness of the crime committed and the degree to which his record
reflects a past criminal history. The Freitag court's consideration of acts
not committed by the defendant constitutes a clear dereliction of its duty
to interpret the SRA as it stands. If the SRA is to be read as authorizing
consideration of a defendant's lack of mitigating or aggravating
109. 106 Wash. 2d 547, 723 P.2d 1111 (1986).
110. Id. at 551,723 P.2d at 1114.
111. 70 Wash. App. 608, 854 P.2d 1105 (1993), rev'don other grounds, 125 Wash. 2d 717, 888
P.2d 1169 (1995).
112. Id. at 613, 854 P.2d at 1107-08.
113. On appeal, the supreme court indicated its support for the appellate court's interpretation.
125 Wash. 2d 717,724, 888 P.2d 1169, 1172 (1995).
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circumstances as justification for departing from the standard range, then
it is up to the legislature, not the courts, to make such a determination.
2. Freitag Erroneously Interprets Legislative Silence on the Issue of
Misdemeanor Convictions
Had the legislature intended to afford such weight to misdemeanor
convictions as to allow them to justify departures from the standard
range, it would have specifically provided for this in the language of the
act. Legislative silence on the relative weight of misdemeanor
convictions should not be interpreted otherwise. 14 Rather than recognize
legislative silence for what it is, the Freitag court reasoned that the
legislature intended to let the courts decide "when, whelther and to what
extent" the presence or absence of uncounted offenses may be
considered." 5
The Freitag majority repeatedly stated that it is essenial to consider a
defendant's misdemeanor record, or lack thereof, so as to ascertain that
individual's predisposition to commit a crime." 6 The SRA makes it
unavoidably clear, however, that its primary purpose is to punish an
offender for the crime committed, not for one's predisposition to commit
such crimes. The majority's opinion comes dangerously close to
sanctioning a higher degree of punishment for a defendant because one
has a bad character or because the court speculates that one is likely to
commit some crime in the future."7
Consideration of an offender's personality is contrary to the goal of
the SRA that the sentencing guidelines apply equally to all offenders
without discrimination. Yet Freitag asserts that all offinder scores are
114. 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction 577 (5th ed. 1992).
115. State v. Freitag, 74 Wash. App. 133, 144, 873 P.2d 548, 554 (1994).
116. "Ms. Freitag's '0' offender score did not reflect her complete lack ,f any police contacts
whatsoever, a fact not otherwise accounted for under the SRA." Id. at 140-41, 873 P.2d at 552. "Her
'0' offender score does not reflect the full degree of her reduced criminal culpability, i.e., of her lack
of any predisposition to drink and drive or to commit any other type of criminal or traffic offense."
Id. at 144, 873 P.2d at 554. "[W]e conclude that in cases where the complete absence of criminal
history, i.e., of uncounted criminal history, reflects the total absence of predisposition to commit not
only the current offense but any other type of crime whatsoever, a substantial and compelling reason
exists for an exceptional sentence downward.' Id. at 145, 873 P.2d at 554.
117. Even evidentiary rules prohibit consideration of a person's bad character. While allowing
character evidence to come in under the auspices of impeachment or if the defendant puts his
character at issue, the rules are clear that evidence of a defendant's character may not be used solely
to prove his propensity to commit the crime in question. See Wash. P. Evid. 404(a).
584
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not created equal."' Applying the majority's rationale, a defendant who
has no prior felony convictions but does have one recorded misdemeanor
is undeserving of the same lenient treatment given to another defendant
with no felony or misdemeanor convictions. As the dissent noted, it is
doubtful that the legislature intended such a hair-splitting distinction to
determine whether a defendant is deserving of an exceptional sentence." 9
Consideration of misdemeanor convictions perverts the intention of the
legislature to provide exceptional sentences only when warranted by
exceptional circumstances.
3. The Majority's Reliance Upon State v. Nelson Was Misplaced
Considering Nelson's Narrow Holding
In Nelson,2 ' the supreme court approved of reliance upon a
defendant's complete lack of criminal history to support departure from
the standard range. This holding is, however, fact-specific. Despite the
Freitag court's protestations otherwise, Nelson is narrowly restricted to
situations involving failed entrapment defenses, where predisposition to
commit a crime is an element of that defense. Considering the restricted
scope of its holding, Nelson should not be interpreted to allow
exceptional sentences based upon a defendant's lack of misdemeanor
convictions.'
At his trial, Nelson asserted a defense of entrapment, which ultimately
failed. As one scholar of the entrapment issue has noted, however,
defenses which fall just short of their proof may nonetheless be used to
justify an exceptional sentence." In fact, the failed entrapment defense
is one of the illustrative mitigating factors provided for in the SRA.'P
The facts of Nelson show that the defendant played only a secondary
role in the crime. In 1985, Nelson was persuaded by his co-defendant to
hold a bag while the co-defendant robbed two service stations of money.
In return for a lesser charge, Nelson agreed to cooperate with and assist
118. Freitag, 74 Wash. App. at 140, 873 P.2d at 552.
119. Id. at 152, 873 P.2d at 558 (Forrest, ., dissenting).
120. State v. Nelson, 108 Wash. 2d 491,740 P.2d 835 (1987).
121. Since Nelson, the supreme court has decided State v. Estrella, 115 Wash. 2d 350, 798 P.2d
289 (1990), and State v. Rogers, 112 Wash. 2d 180, 770 P.2d 180 (1989), both of which have held
that criminal history is not a proper basis for imposing a sentence below the standard range. In light
of the timing of these two cases, Nelson should be limited to situations involving failed entrapment
defenses.
122. Boemer, supra note 7, § 9.12(c).
123. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.390(l)(d) (1994).
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the state's prosecution of his co-defendant. His lesser offense carried a
presumptive sentence of thirty-one to forty-one months. Noting that
Nelson had no police record (felony, misdemeanor, or arrest), the trial
judge gave him an exceptional sentence of twelve months in jail.124
Contrary to the Freitag majority's opinion, the Nelson holding should
be restricted to facts involving a failed defense of entrapment as the
mitigating factor justifying an exceptional sentence below the standard
range. In Nelson, the supreme court upheld the exceptional sentence. It
found that the trial court was justified in relying upon evidence which
showed that it was the codefendant who induced Nelson to commit the
crime with him. Considering this failed entrapment defense, the court
held that the complete absence of criminal history whatsoever is an
appropriate matter for the sentencing judge to consider, insofar as it
supports a finding that the defendant lacked the predisposition to commit
the crimes. "5
Unlike Nelson, Freitag had no failed entrapment defense at her
disposal. Thus, consideration of her complete lack of misdemeanor
offenses is inappropriate. Her crime must be seen fCr what it is: an
unfortunate episode in her life, certainly, but one which is unexceptional
from every other vehicular assault committed and thereore undeserving
of exceptional treatment. Although Freitag may be a good person and
her total lack of prior police contacts may indeed indicate her lack of
predisposition to commit future crimes, these are not proper bases upon
which to justify a sentence of one day of incarceration plus community
service. The legislature has already provided an appropriate, albeit
harsher, sentence for her offense.
IV. FREITAG SETS A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT
As a court of appeals decision, Freitag carries sufficient weight to
give trial courts the opportunity to depart from the tenets of the SRA
when imposing exceptional sentences. This opportunity was taken
advantage of in one recent, well-publicized case from the superior court
of Snohomish county. In State v. Guthrie,126 two Alaskan Native youths
convicted of assault were given the exceptional sentence of banishment
on remote islands. By relying specifically on Freitag, the Guthrie court
124. Nelson, 108 Wash. 2d at 494, 740 P.2d at 837-38 (1987).
125. Id. at 498, 740 P.2d at 839.
126. Verbatim Report of Proceedings, State v. Guthrie, No. 93-1-01369-2 (Wash. Super. Ct,
Snohomish County) (Aug.12, 1994).
Vol. 70:563, 1995
Exceptional Sentencing
felt justified in imposing a sentence which had never before been used
against persons convicted of the same statutory offense. Guthrie
demonstrates the danger of Freitag's precedential authority by imposing
a sentence that was clearly against the principles of the SRA and its
primary goal of eliminating disparity of sentencing within Washington's
state courts.
The Guthrie court stated that Freitag represented a movement away
from a strict interpretation of the SRA. 27 In denying the state's motion
for reconsideration, the court noted that Freitag allows courts to look at
such things as a defendant's demonstrated clear pattern of civic and
social responsibility, the risk of reoffense, age, sense of remorse,
cooperation with authorities, family support, and any voluntary
restitution the defendant may have made to his victim before being
sentenced.12  Probably most significant was the Guthrie court's
following statement:
For the first time... a trial court has stepped forward and said to
the Legislature I want more discretion, I want to look at the
defendant and not just at the crime. And for the first time the Court
of Appeals has said all right, we will allow that and see how it
works.
129
Although it acknowledged that Freitag was obviously in direct
conflict with Washington case law, even within its own appellate court
division, 3° Guthrie found the appellate court's holding too convenient to
ignore. As a result, it handed down a decision which amounts to
discrimination against other similarly situated defendants. This holding
is the exact type of result that the SRA was designed to prevent.
Unfortunately, Freitag has allowed it to resurface.
V. CONCLUSION
Freitag represents much more than the struggle between trial judges'
desire to tailor sentences to individual circumstances and the legislature's
determination of proper methods of sentencing. Freitag represents a
split of authority within the appellate court itself, and certainly within the
first division. This split presents uncertainty for the defendant who
127. Id. at 38.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 3S-39.
130. Id. at 39.
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comes before a trial judge who may or may not side with the panel
represented by Judge Forrest and his opinions. Whether subjective
factors, the cited purposes of the SRA, or a complete absence of criminal
history may justify exceptional sentences outside the standard range are
issues that have unnecessarily created tension within the court system.
Washington case law and the SRA are controlling authority: without the
presence of circumstances so exceptional that the nature of the offense at
hand is unavoidably distinguishable from all other offenses falling within
the same statutory category, none of these factors, together or
individually, justifies departure from the standard range. In the absence
of specific legislative action overturning the Freitag decision, the
Washington Supreme Court would be supported by case law and the
SRA in establishing unequivocally that, in the interests of justice and
fairness in criminal proceedings and to respect the spirit and letter of the
SRA, the Freitag decision should not stand.
